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I. Introduction
This chapter reviews the efforts of Russia and the United States to conclude
agreements on the control or reduction of their inventories of nuclear warheads
and military fissile materials. While some of the negotiations attempted to cod
ify arms limitation and reduction measures, others were aimed at constraining
the spread of fissile materials and technologies to the non-nuclear weapon states
(NNWS). A number of the negotiations had elements of both arms control and
non-proliferation.
Most of the monitoring provisions contained in nuclear agreements between
Russia and the USA are in the category of transparency measures—those that
give confidence that a state is fulfilling its obligations. Some transparency
measures are unilateral and are intended to enhance confidence or goodwill.
Verification measures, on the other hand, usually require more intrusive moni
toring—enough to ensure a high likelihood that parties are in compliance with a
treaty—and require formal, legally binding agreements. Taken together, these
measures apply to parts of the parties’ nuclear weapon complexes, with the con
spicuous exception of warhead facilities. Nonetheless, the joint efforts of the
past decade have laid the technical groundwork for extending the scope of
monitoring to warheads.

II. Early efforts to control warheads and fissile materials
Proposals for controlling and accounting for warheads and fissile materials have
a long history, dating back to the first meeting of the United Nations General
Assembly, in January 1946. The first General Assembly resolution established
the UN Atomic Energy Commission, with the mandate to ‘make specific pro
posals . . . for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and
of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction’.1 At the first meeting
of this commission, in June 1946, US Representative Bernard Baruch put for
ward a proposal for international control with a call for the creation of an Inter
1 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1 (I), 24 Jan. 1946; the resolution is reproduced in
United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946–47 (UN: New York, 1947), pp. 64–66.

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the US National Academy of Sciences.
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national Atomic Development Authority that would own or manage all nuclear
activities for military applications. The proposal also called for the dismantle
ment of nuclear warheads under the following conditions.
When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the renunciation of
the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put into effective operation and
condign punishments set up for violations of the rules of control which are to be stig
matized as international crimes, we propose that: (1) manufacture of atomic bombs
shall stop; (2) existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the treaty;
and (3) the Authority shall be in possession of full information as to the know-how for
the production of atomic energy.2

Ultimately, the Baruch Plan failed because of the irreconcilable differences
between the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States during the cold
war. The Soviet Union would not accept the provision for sanctions against vio
lations without the right of a veto by the five permanent members of the UN
Security Council. It also wanted a prohibition on nuclear weapons before a ver
ification system was put in place, which the United States would not accept.
Comprehensive nuclear disarmament remained on the UN agenda, but the
reliance on nuclear weapons during the cold war blocked any attempt to achieve
even modest measures. With the entry into force in 1970 of the 1968 Treaty on
the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT), the
role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in monitoring the
compliance of the NNWS was expanded. However, the five states formally rec
ognized as nuclear weapon states (NWS) under the NPT were not required to
accept IAEA safeguards on their nuclear facilities.3 The international experience
with implementing IAEA safeguards for non-proliferation purposes is
nonetheless relevant for a number of the tasks that would be part of a compre
hensive nuclear arms reduction regime.
Fissile materials and the 1967–69 dismantlement demonstration
In 1956 President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed a ban on the production of
fissile material for weapon purposes. In the following decade, the Warsaw
Treaty Organization, the Western countries and many non-aligned states made
similar proposals, but no serious negotiations took place.
In 1966 the USA made a proposal that was more limited but still remarkable
for the times to the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Under this proposal the
USA and the USSR would transfer highly enriched uranium (HEU) from
weapons to peaceful uses under international safeguards. The USA offered to
2 US Department of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1956 (US Government Printing Office:
Washington, DC, 1960), pp. 10–15, available at URL <http://highered.mcgraw-hill.com/olc/dl/35265/
2_3.html>.
3 The 5 NPT-recognized NWS are China, France, Russia (formerly the USSR), the UK and the USA.
The NWS make some of their civilian facilities, but not their military facilities, eligible for IAEA monitor
ing under Voluntary Offer Agreements.
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transfer 60 tonnes of HEU under the condition that the USSR would transfer
40 tonnes to peaceful uses. Both states were expected to demonstrate ‘the
destruction of nuclear weapons to make HEU available for transfer to peaceful
nuclear energy under international safeguards, and to halt the production of
weapon-usable nuclear materials’.4
As part of the US Government’s assessment of the verifiability of this pro
posal, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), working with the
US Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense (DOD), cre
ated Project Cloud Gap for demonstration inspections of dismantlement.5 The
experiments were carried out at the Pantex (Texas), Rocky Flats (Colorado),
Paducah (Kentucky) and Oak Ridge (Tennessee) facilities. Inspectors were
given extensive access to the Pantex facility for close observation and monitor
ing of weapon dismantlement.6 At Rocky Flats they monitored the disassembly
of warhead pits and separation of materials into plutonium, uranium and other
residue. At Paducah they monitored the separation of materials into salvageable
categories and the disposal of classified residue. At the Y-12 plant at Oak
Ridge, they monitored the disassembly of HEU parts and the melting and cast
ing of HEU into ingots. The inspectors carried minimal equipment, such as
cameras, scales, Geiger counters, portable neutron counters and gamma-ray
spectrometers, and collected samples for mass spectrometer measurements of
the isotopic concentrations of the materials. The experiment monitored 40 war
heads undergoing scheduled disassembly, along with 32 fake warheads.
The principle behind the experiments was to provide unrestricted visual
access to the dismantlement process in order to ensure that warhead dismantle
ment was taking place. There was no attempt to conceal classified information.7
With this degree of open access, the ACDA report’s conclusion that classified
information would be revealed came as no surprise. However, the report also
concluded that information ‘could be protected by redesign of facilities and
equipment’.8 This project highlighted the tension between obtaining the needed
degree of confidence that weapons were being destroyed and protecting sensi
tive information—a tension that is still central to efforts to design effective
monitoring arrangements.

4 Fisher, A. (Deputy Director, ACDA), Conference on Disarmament, Documents on Disarmament,
6 Mar. 1966, pp. 122–23. ‘We agree first to the demonstrated destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons
by the United States and the Soviet Union; second, to the transfer to peaceful purposes under international
safeguards of the large quantities of fissionable material obtained from this destruction; and third to a ver
ified halt in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes’.
5 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), ‘Final Report, vol. 1. Field Test FT-34: Demon
strated Destruction of Nuclear Weapons’ (Jan. 1969, released with deletions under the Freedom of Infor
mation Act). See also von Hippel, F., ‘The 1969 ACDA study on warhead dismantlement’, Science &
Global Security, vol. 2, no. 1 (1990), pp. 103–108, available at URL <http://www.princeton.edu/
%7Eglobsec/publications/pdf/2_1vonHippel.pdf>.
6 ACDA (note 5), pp. 51–56.
7 ACDA (note 5), p. 76.
8 ACDA (note 5), p. 10.
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Warhead monitoring in cold war nuclear arms control agreements
INF and START
The major agreements to limit or reduce offensive nuclear arms that were
negotiated by the two superpowers during and immediately after the cold war—
the SALT I and II agreements, the INF Treaty, and the START I and II
treaties9 —focused on delivery vehicles and launchers. Warheads were dealt
with mainly through ‘counting rules’ that attributed a certain number of
deployed warheads to a particular delivery vehicle, for the following reasons.
1. Ballistic missiles are the major delivery vehicle for nuclear warheads.
2. Ballistic missiles, silos, submarines and bombers are much larger and eas
ier to count than nuclear warheads. They are also far more difficult to hide than
warheads or their fissile material components. Technologies such as templates,
attributes and information barriers were not available at that time to properly
verify warhead dismantlement without the risk of revealing sensitive design
information, and national technical means (NTM) could only assess delivery
vehicle inventories. Nor were the USA and the USSR willing to accept the level
of intrusiveness required to verify limits on warheads.
3. The number and characteristics of the Soviet and US deployed strategic
delivery vehicles and launchers provided better measures of the strategic signif
icance of their nuclear arsenals than the size of their warhead or fissile-material
stockpiles. The traditional concerns of both states were with warheads that can
be delivered rapidly and accurately over long distances, although delivery by
aircraft, ships and trucks was also a concern.
4. Modern strategic delivery vehicles are expensive, typically costing the
USA, for example, 10 times more to develop, produce and maintain than the
nuclear warheads they carry. The elimination of delivery vehicles therefore
created a greater barrier to reconstituting deployable nuclear weapons.
The INF and START treaties nonetheless contain provisions relating to war
heads.10
The INF Treaty preceded the winding down of the cold war.11 It was the first
Soviet–US agreement to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons, banning
the possession and deployment of ground-launched missiles with ranges of
500–5500 kilometres. In carrying out its INF obligations, the USSR destroyed

9 The 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement, the 1979 Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
(SALT II), the 1987 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles
(INF Treaty), the 1991 Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I),
and the 1993 Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II, not in
force; on 14 June 2002, as a response to the expiration of the ABM Treaty on 13 June, Russia declared that
it will no longer be bound by the START II Treaty).
10 The provisions of the START treaties are discussed in section III.
11 The INF Treaty, US Senate Executive Report 100-15 (US Government Printing Office: Washington,
DC, 14 Apr. 1988).
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1800 missiles, capable of carrying over 3000 warheads, and the USA destroyed
850 single-warhead missiles.12
One of the most important verification issues was the need to determine that
the banned SS-20 missile was no longer deployed by the Soviet Union.13 This
was difficult, because the first stages of the permitted long-range (strategic)
SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the prohibited intermediaterange (theatre) SS-20 missile are similar.14 In addition, because SS-25 canisters
are larger than SS-20 canisters, an SS-25 canister could contain an SS-20
missile.
The problem was further complicated by the Soviet deployment of SS-25s at
some former SS-20 bases. SS-25s have one warhead and SS-20s have three, so
the patterns of neutron and gamma-ray emissions from the plutonium in the
warheads are different for the two systems. Under the INF Treaty, this differ
ence could be measured with radiation-detection equipment, which measures
the flux of neutrons while the missile is in its canister but gives no critical
information on warhead design.15 Under the INF Treaty the parties had the right
to establish a permanent continuous monitoring system. The USA built a
perimeter-portal continuous monitoring (PPCM) system at the Soviet Votkinsk
Machine Building Plant, 500 km east of Moscow,16 and the USSR monitored
the US Hercules Plant Number 1 at Magna, Utah, where Pershing II rocket
engines were produced. The PPCM monitoring facility operated at Votkinsk for
the duration of the treaty, from 1988 to 2001. Under the INF Treaty inspectors
could measure the length and weight of all objects entering and leaving the
missile factory. All road and rail shipping containers large enough to hold an
SS-20 missile were made available at Votkinsk for X-ray imaging with a modi
fied version of a commercial scanner, the CargoScan. The X-ray images
showed the length and diameter of the first stages of the missiles to ensure that
they were not SS-20 first stages. In addition, inspectors could visually inspect
and measure a missile inside its canister eight times a year. This random inspec
tion of canisters provided a great deterrent to cheating. US inspectors also
patrolled the 5-km perimeter fences around Votkinsk.17
12 The START Treaty, US Senate Executive Report 102-53 (US Government Printing Office: Washing
ton, DC, 18 Sep. 1992). Under the INF Treaty, the USSR destroyed 654 SS-20 missiles capable of carry
ing 3 warheads each. In addition, the SS-4, SS-5, SS-12, SS-20, SS-23 and SSC-X missiles were
destroyed. The USA destroyed 169 Pershing 1As, 234 Pershing IIs and 443 ground-launched cruise
missiles.
13 Harahan, J. P., On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty (US On-Site Inspection Agency: Washing
ton, DC, 1993), p. 145.
14 Strategic nuclear weapons are those with intercontinental range (>5500 km); theatre (also called tac
tical or non-strategic) nuclear weapons have less than intercontinental range (<5500 km).
15 Ewing, R. I. and Marlow, K.W., ‘A fast-neutron detector used in verification of the INF Treaty’,
Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research, vol. A299 (1990), pp. 559–61. The detailed proce
dures for carrying out inspections with radiation detection equipment were too complex to negotiate into
treaty language, so it was left to the INF Standing Verification Commission (SVC) to establish inspection
procedures. The SVC agreed on the use of fast neutron detectors to determine the spatial pattern of radia
tion outside of canisters for field inspections.
16 Harahan (note 13), p. 67.
17 Similarly, the START I Treaty permitted the USA to build a PPCM at the Pavlograd plant in
Ukraine, where the SS-24 ICBM was built, and permitted the USSR to build a PPCM at Promontory,
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The Slava experiment
On 5 July 1989 a team of Soviet and US scientists measured the gamma-ray
spectra from a Soviet warhead mounted on an SS-N-12 cruise missile on the
Slava cruiser with a high-purity germanium detector.18 The most detectable
gamma transitions showed the presence of uranium-235, plutonium-239 and
uranium-232. The presence of uranium-232 indicated that the uranium in the
Soviet warhead had resided in a nuclear reactor before being used as feedstock
for an enrichment plant. The data also showed a transition, which the investiga
tors interpreted as being induced by inelastic neutron scattering on the iron
missile-support structure.19 Another transition was interpreted as coming from
the absorption of neutrons by hydrogen. This was consistent with the consider
able amount of hydrogen in the missile fuel and in the high explosives around
the nuclear weapon.
The Soviet–US team also monitored neutron emissions from the warhead on
the Slava.20 A helicopter carrying neutron detectors flew at a distance of
30–80 metres from the warhead. The detectors were designed to observe a war
head at distances of 100–150 metres with the requirement that the signal must
be more than three times the standard deviation (σ ) of the background. The neu
tron data from the passage of the helicopter at 30 metres were about two to
three times greater than the 3σ-background level.

III. Major post-cold war initiatives
The end of the cold war offered both great hope and great danger. Soviet/
Russian and US leaders saw an opportunity to transform their relationship from
a hostile to a cooperative one, reducing the risks that the two states’ nuclear
arsenals had posed to each other’s forces and homelands, and to international
security more broadly. The collapse of the Soviet Union also brought fears con
cerning the security of thousands of nuclear warheads and tonnes of fissile
materials and the proliferation risks of ‘loose nukes’.21 In responding to these
risks and opportunities, leaders in Russia and the USA undertook remarkable
Utah, where the Peacekeeper ICBM was built. A PPCM facility houses c. 30 inspectors and costs about
$10 million per year.
18 Fetter, S. et al., ‘Gamma-ray measurements of a Soviet cruise-missile warhead’, Science, vol. 248,
(1990), pp. 828–34.
19 The gamma-ray detector had a resolution of 2 kilo-electronvolts (keV) (full-width at half-maximum)
at 1000 keV, with a diameter of 5.9 cm and a length of 5.9 cm. The gamma-ray spectra from the weapon
were measured for 24 minutes, followed by measurements of an empty missile tube for 10 minutes. Back
ground measurements were carried out for 70 minutes. Inelastic collisions with neutrons can create gamma
rays from excited states of stable nuclei. When fast neutrons collide with iron-56 nuclei, they can excite
the 846.9 keV state of iron-56 while reducing the amount of total kinetic energy.
20 Belyaev, S. et al., ‘The use of helicopter-borne neutron detectors to detect nuclear warheads in the
USSR–US Black Sea Experiment’, eds F. von Hippel and R. Sagdeev, Reversing the Arms Race: How to
Achieve and Verify Deep Reductions in the Nuclear Arsenals (Gordon and Breach: New York, 1990),
pp. 328–33.
21 Campbell, K. M. et al., Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating
Soviet Union, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, BCSIA Studies in International Security
no. 1 (Harvard University: Cambridge, Mass., Nov. 1991).
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Figure 5.1. Diagram of the Russian nuclear weapon cycle and Russian–US monitoring
requirements
HEU = highly enriched uranium; LEU = low-enriched uranium; MOX = mixed oxide fuel;
Pu = plutonium; PuO2 = plutonium dioxide.
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Existing monitoring requirements: H = 1993 HEU Agreement; I = IAEA Voluntary Safe
guards on select nuclear explosive materials (NEM), (in the process of ratification).
Monitoring requirements under discussion between Russia and the USA: A = Agreement for
Cooperation for Russian Spent Fuel Repository (under discussion); F = Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty (first discussed in 1993, intermittently since then); M = 1996 Mayak Storage Facility
Transparency Agreement; p = Processing and Packaging Implementation Agreement (discussed
in 1997–99); P = 2000 Plutonium Disposition and Management Agreement (not in force);
R = 1997 Agreement concerning Cooperation Regarding Production Reactors; S = START III
accord (discussed in 2000); T = Trilateral Initiative (proposed in 1996, under discussion).
This figure represents the Russian cycle for the dismantlement of nuclear warheads and final
disposition of excess NEM. (It should be noted that the US cycle is slightly different.) The fig
ure does not show the re-manufacture of nuclear warheads, monitoring of deployed warheads
under START or elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and launchers. Nor does it
include the possibility of Russian reprocessing of US-origin spent fuel, but it does consider the
possibility of the US import of Russian MOX.
Source: Adapted from Doyle, J. and Seitz, S., ‘Applied monitoring and transparency initiatives
for nuclear weapon fissile materials reductions’, Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Meeting of the
Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (2001) (on CD), available from the Institute of
Nuclear Materials Management, email address inmm@inmm.org.

initiatives that have provided at least the basic foundations for much more
cooperative and comprehensive arrangements to control nuclear warheads and
materials. Figure 5.1 illustrates the sequence and context of the numerous
technical and diplomatic initiatives and efforts in relation to different parts of
the complex Russian nuclear weapon cycle.
Unilateral initiatives
Non-strategic nuclear weapons
In 1991 President George H. W. Bush announced the withdrawal of all US
ground- and sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons to the USA. All of the
ground-launched and about half of the sea-launched weapons would be
destroyed. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev responded with the announce
ment that all Soviet tactical nuclear weapons would be withdrawn to the
Russian Federation, and that nuclear artillery, ground-launched missile war
heads and nuclear mines would be destroyed. In 1992 Russian President Boris
Yeltsin confirmed and extended Gorbachev’s pledges. In addition to destroying
all ground-launched tactical warheads, he announced that Russia would destroy
half of its air-launched tactical warheads, half of its nuclear warheads for anti
aircraft missiles and one-third of its tactical sea-launched nuclear warheads.
Full implementation of the pledges in the 1991–92 Presidential Nuclear Initia
tives (PNIs) would mean that approximately 5000 US tactical warheads would
be destroyed.22 The number of Russian warheads scheduled for destruction is
more difficult to judge; the US Central Intelligence Agency gave an estimate of
22 Excerpts from the PNIs are reproduced in SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarma
ment (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1992), pp. 85–92.
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5000–15 000 warheads.23 Under the PNIs, the unilateral reductions were not
subject to monitoring, nor were there meaningful transparency measures. It is
therefore not known whether the reductions were carried out completely.
Fissile materials
The end of the cold war left Russia and the USA with large stockpiles of plu
tonium and HEU, far more than they could possibly need for nuclear weapon
production or maintenance of stockpiles. Both governments gradually came to
the conclusion that continued production of fissile material was unnecessary,
and they took unilateral action during the late 1980s and early 1990s to close
down the fissile material manufacturing facilities which were still in operation.24
After the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power facility in 1986, there was
widespread public concern, particularly in the USA, about the environmental
hazards associated with nuclear energy in general and plutonium production in
particular. The resulting public pressure added further impetus to the decision to
stop the production of fissile material.25
In the USA the process of closing production facilities extended over more
than two decades. Production of HEU for weapons ceased in 1964, although
production of HEU continued for naval and research reactors until 1988.26 The
US Government announced in November 1991 that all HEU production would
be suspended. Plutonium production reactors were closed beginning in 1964 as
new reactor designs went on-line and as the need for plutonium diminished.
The last two operating production reactors, located at Savannah River, South
Carolina, were closed in 1988 because of safety concerns. The House of Repre
sentatives passed an amendment to the Defense Department budget in July of
the following year urging the president to negotiate with the Soviet Union a
bilateral ban on fissile material production for warheads. Finally, in July 1992
President Bush announced that, as part of a non-proliferation initiative, the USA
would no longer produce fissile material.27
The Soviet Union stopped the production of weapon-grade uranium in 1988
and of plutonium in 1994 (except at three reactors).28 President Yeltsin, reiterat
ing an offer made earlier by Gorbachev, suggested in January 1992 that Russia
and the USA negotiate a bilateral fissile material production cut-off treaty. An
23 Gershwin, L. (National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs), DOD Appropriations for FY93,
Testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, Part 5, 6 May 1992, p. 499.
24 Fissile material used in nuclear weapons typically consists of plutonium-239 or uranium enriched in
the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235. See chapter 7, section III, in this volume.
25 Albright, D. and O’Neill, K. (eds), The Challenges of Fissile Material Control (Institute for Science
and International Security: Washington, DC, 1999), pp. 100–101.
26 Grand, C., ‘A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and the future of nuclear arms control’, ed. J.
Cirincione, Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Routledge:
New York, 2000), p. 236.
27 Albright and O’Neill (note 25), p. 101; and Lockwood, D., ‘Nuclear arms control’, SIPRI Yearbook
1993: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1993), p. 571.
28 Albright and O’Neill (note 25), p. 101; and Albright, D., Berkhout, F. and Walker, W, SIPRI, Plu
tonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies (Oxford Uni
versity Press: Oxford, 1997).
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announcement was made that same month that Russia would stop all production
of weapon-grade plutonium by 2000 regardless of whether an agreement was
reached. However, the three production reactors are still operating, to provide
heat and power for local residents. The Russian and US governments are
working together on a plan to replace the reactors with an alternative source of
energy.29
START: Russian–US agreements on strategic nuclear weapons
The end of the cold war enabled Russia and the USA to make genuine reduc
tions in their strategic nuclear forces. The START I Treaty, which was signed
on 31 July 1991 and entered into force on 5 December 1994, obligates Russia
and the USA to limit their deployed strategic forces to 1600 strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles each and 6000 treaty-accountable nuclear warheads each.
START I covers only deployed strategic warheads and their delivery vehicles,
not warheads after they have been removed from their delivery vehicles.
START I was followed relatively quickly by the START II Treaty, signed by
Presidents Bush and Yeltsin on 3 January 1993. START II contains the obliga
tion for both signatories to ban intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple
independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVed ICBMs) and to make fur
ther phased reductions to no more than 3500 deployed strategic warheads,
approximately one-third of the size of the Soviet and US strategic arsenals at
the time START I was signed. START II did not enter into force because of the
US–Russian controversy over the future of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty, expired as of 13 June 2002 owing
to the US withdrawal).
The START process moved beyond reliance on NTM to introduce bilateral
verification measures, some of which relate to deployed strategic warheads. The
total number of START-accountable missile warheads is obtained by multiply
ing the number of deployed missiles by the number of warheads attributed to
each missile under the treaty’s counting rules. The individual warheads
mounted on missiles are contained in re-entry vehicles. START I permits each
party 10 re-entry vehicle on-site inspections each year to verify that the number
of re-entry vehicles on a selected missile does not exceed the number attributed
to that type of missile. If START II had been implemented, the number of such
inspections would have increased to 14 per year.
In order to prevent inspectors from gaining access to classified information,
the inspected party places an opaque cover over the warheads on the missile
bus. The cover has protrusions that provide space for each re-entry vehicle; the
number of protrusions must be less than or equal to the attributed number of
re-entry vehicles. In cases of discrepancy, the inspected party can allow the use
of radiation detection equipment to clarify whether the extra object is a war
29 Albright

and O’Neill (note 25), p. 101; and Albright, Berkhout and Walker (note 28), pp. 80, 95.
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head. The US Department of Energy (DOE) has also developed radiation
imaging systems to count warheads.30
The Biden Amendment and the START and SORT treaties
The September 1992 US Senate debate on ratification of the START I Treaty
raised concerns about Russia’s ability to rapidly redeploy warheads that have
been removed from their delivery vehicles. There was also great concern about
the security of nuclear weapons and materials. To address these concerns, an
amendment proposed by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr was incorporated into the
resolution of ratification.
Nuclear Stockpile Weapons Arrangement. Inasmuch as the prospect of a loss of control
of nuclear weapons or fissile material in the former Soviet Union could pose a serious
threat to the United States and to international peace and security, in connection with
any further agreement reducing strategic offensive arms, the President shall seek an
appropriate arrangement, including the use of reciprocal inspections, data exchanges,
and other cooperative measures, to monitor (A) the numbers of nuclear stockpile
weapons on the territory of the parties to this Treaty; and (B) the location and inven
tory of facilities on the territories of the parties to this treaty capable of producing or
processing significant quantities of fissile materials. 31

The Biden Amendment was interpreted to apply to a future START III
accord, since the START II negotiations were moving to a conclusion at that
time. The amendment provided a major impetus for the US Government to
explore technical and policy approaches to monitoring warheads. In 2002,
presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin agreed to forego the START II
and START III treaties. In its place, they signed the Strategic Offensive Reduc
tions Treaty (SORT) with a limit of 1700–2200 operational warheads, which is
the same limit as that proposed for START III, if non-operational submarines
in maintenance are taken into account. The SORT negotiations and treaty did
not consider the monitoring methods described in this volume.

30 See, e.g., Ziock, K. P. ‘Gamma-ray imaging spectrometry’, Science and Technology Review, Oct.
1995, pp. 14–26; and Ziock, K. P. et al., ‘A Germanium-based coded aperture gamma-ray imager’, Pro
ceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (2000) (on CD),
available from the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, email address inmm@inmm.org. The
Gamma-Ray Imaging System uses a coded aperture to preferentially absorb gamma rays. The spatial pat
tern of surviving gamma rays is measured and analysed to count the number of warheads. Another
approach is the Radiation Pattern Identification System, which uses directionally sensitive gamma-ray
detectors and a segmented neutron detector with minimal directional sensitivity. These detectors are
mounted on a platform that is moved around the periphery of the missile. The intensity patterns are
Fourier-analysed to count warheads.
31 The START Treaty, US Senate Executive Report 102-53 (US Government Printing Office: Washing
ton, DC, 18 Sep. 1992), resolution of ratification, p. 101.
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The Cooperative Threat Reduction programme
The collapse of the Soviet Union raised fears of a loss of control over thousands
of deployed strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons and hundreds of tonnes
of fissile material—the scenario for a proliferation nightmare. In the autumn of
1991 a bipartisan effort led by US Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar
addressed these dangers, and their proposal was passed by the Senate.32 The
legislation authorized the president to transfer up to $400 million from the
appropriated defence budget for 1992, making the DOD the first major agency
engaged in what became known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
programme. US assistance for CTR and other programmes totalled $5.5 billion
in the 1990s.33
In the early years, the CTR programme focused on assisting Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine in their efforts to return all former Soviet nuclear war
heads on their territories to Russia and to dismantle or destroy the associated
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and silos. It also provided assistance to
Russia to eliminate strategic nuclear arms on its territory. Altogether, the pro
gramme facilitated the dismantlement of over 2000 former Soviet strategic
missiles and launchers.34 It also contributed to funding the construction of the
nuclear materials storage facility at Mayak.35 The CTR programme has funded
such diverse activities as the provision of nuclear material containers, the
refurbishment of Russian railway wagons for the transport of nuclear materials
and the acquisition of nuclear accident response equipment.
The Russian and US governments soon recognized that the risks of theft or
diversion of fissile material posed ‘a clear and present danger to national and
international security’.36 Russian–US programmes were developed to improve
fissile materials protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) in the former
Soviet Union. These programmes were shifted from the DOD to the DOE in
order to more accurately identify facilities for MPC&A upgrades and define
responsibilities for the participating organizations.
The CTR programme was a remarkable initiative undertaken in response to
extraordinary circumstances. Engaging directly in programmes to ensure the
security of nuclear warheads and fissile materials gave the USA unprecedented
32 Coombs, R., ‘US domestic politics and the Nunn–Lugar program’, eds J. M. Shields and W. C.
Potter, Dismantling the Cold War: US and NIS Perspectives on the Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Pro
gram (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1997).
33 US General Accounting Office (GAO), Nuclear Proliferation: Coordination of US Programs
Designed to Reduce the Threat Posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction, GAO-02-180T (GAO: Washing
ton, DC, 2001), p. 2.
34 US Defense Threat Reduction Agency, ‘Fact sheet on cooperative threat reduction’, Jan. 2002. The
dismantled systems included 443 ICBMs, 409 ICBM launchers, 87 bombers, 483 air-launched cruise
missiles, 209 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and 368 SLBM launchers on 21 nuclearpowered ballistic-missile submarines.
35 US General Accounting Office (GAO), Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian
Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less than Planned, GAO/NSIAD-99-76 (GAO: Washington, DC,
1999).
36 National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Management
and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (National Academy Press: Washington, DC, 1994), p. 1.
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access to Russian facilities. Despite the difficulties involved in the implementa
tion of many of its programmes, CTR nonetheless represents an essential part of
the foundation for more comprehensive limits.
Laboratory-to-laboratory programmes
Not surprisingly, the implementation of new programmes proved slow, given
the long tradition of secrecy in the Russian nuclear complex. To circumvent
these difficulties and to take advantage of the potential to build trust through
direct contacts between scientists, the DOE’s national laboratories and their
Russian counterpart institutions initiated a wide variety of contracts for joint
research on technologies for the monitoring, physical security and accountancy
of nuclear weapons and materials.37 Established in 1999, the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-autonomous agency within the DOE,
now has responsibility for the DOE’s cooperative security programmes, includ
ing MPC&A.
The laboratory-to-laboratory contracts are intended to transfer successful
technologies between the parties in order to enhance transparency and arrive at
the best monitoring options. The activities are wide-ranging and include:
(a) physical security and containment of facilities; (b) radiation detection tech
niques; (c) fissile material accounting; (d) plutonium disposition in general;
(e) plutonium storage at Mayak; (f) purchase of Russian HEU; and (g) monitor
ing warhead dismantlement.
To illustrate the range of activities, over 50 contracts involving warhead dis
mantlement transparency have been implemented by scientists at the US DOE
and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom). They have involved
radiation measurements, computer modelling of dismantlement facilities and
measurements to confirm the removal of high explosives from nuclear weapons.
The participating laboratories in the USA are the DOE nuclear weapon labo
ratories (Los Alamos, Livermore and Sandia) and other DOE laboratories
(Argonne, Brookhaven, Oak Ridge/Y-12, Pacific Northwest and Pantex). About
12 Russian laboratories participate, including the All-Russian Scientific
Research Institute of Experimental Physics in Arzamas-16 (Vserossiyskiy
Nauchno-Issledovatelskiy Institut Experimentalnoy Fiziki, VNIIEF), the AllRussian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics in Chelyabinsk-70
(Vserossiyskiy Nauchno-Issledovatelskiy Institut Tekhnicheskoy Fiziki,
VNIITF), and the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Automatics
(Vserossiyskiy Nauchno-Issledovatelskiy Institut Avtomatiki, VNIIA) and the
Research Institute of Pulse Technique (RIPT), both in Moscow.
In general, the laboratory-to-laboratory exchanges have helped the technical
experts of both states to become familiar and confident with monitoring tech
niques and information barriers. For example, cooperative gamma-ray mea
37 Bieniawski, A. and Irwin, P., ‘Overview of the US–Russian laboratory-to-laboratory warhead dis
mantlement transparency program: a US perspective’, Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Insti
tute for Nuclear Materials Management (2000) (note 30).
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surements of classified objects were carried out without releasing classified
information. Many believe that such programmes progressed successfully
because they developed away from the political spotlight and engaged technical
experts who shared both knowledge and an appreciation of the issues at the
technical level.

IV. The 1990s: initiatives to limit warheads and fissile materials
In order to carry out the broad initiatives put forward for the control and reduc
tion of nuclear weapons and stockpiles and to take advantage of the results,
specific proposals and programmes for Russian–US activities were imple
mented in the 1990s.38 This section outlines some of the most important pro
grammes. It does not cover them all; for example, the important programmes
that sought to provide support and alternative employment for Russian nuclear
scientists and alternative, commercial activities for the former closed nuclear
cities are only mentioned briefly.39
The programmes are discussed under four headings: (a) the diplomatic frame
work; (b) the production and disposition of fissile material; (c) the improvement
of fissile material MPC&A; and (d) the monitoring of warheads.
The diplomatic framework
Agreements for cooperation
Beyond the formidable, but less formal, barriers raised by strong traditions of
secrecy in nuclear matters, any serious effort to increase transparency in the
Russian and US nuclear warhead and fissile material inventories must over
come significant legal hurdles in each state. In the USA, the Atomic Energy Act
38 There are many accounts and assessments of this period. See, e.g., Bunn, M., The Next Wave:
Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material (Carnegie Endowment for Inter
national Peace: Washington, DC, and Harvard University: Cambridge, Mass. 2000), available at URL
<http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/NextWave.pdf>; Goodby, J. E., ‘Transparency and irre
versibility in nuclear warhead disarmament’, ed. H. A. Feiveson, The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint
for Deep Cuts and De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons (Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC, 1999),
pp. 171–92; Thomson, D. B., A Guide to Nuclear Arms Control Treaties, LA-UR-99-3173 (Los Alamos
National Laboratory: Los Alamos, N. Mex., July 1999); Office of Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), US Department of Defense, Arms Control Program Plan, Fiscal
Years 2000-2001 (DOD: Washington, DC, 7 July 2000); Bukharin, O. and Luongo, K., US–Russian
Warhead Dismantlement Transparency: The Status, Problems, and Proposals, PU/CEES-314 (Center for
Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University: Princeton, N.J., Apr. 1999); Bukharin, O., Bunn,
M. and Luongo, K., Renewing the Partnership: Recommendations for Accelerated Action to Secure
Nuclear Material in the Former Soviet Union (Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council:
Princeton, N.J., Aug. 2000); and Luongo, K. N., ‘The uncertain future of US–Russian cooperative nuclear
security’, Arms Control Today, vol. 31, no. 1 (Jan./Feb. 2001), pp. 3–10.
39 More detailed accounts of these programmes can be found in Bunn (note 38); Desmond, W., ‘What is
the Nuclear Cities Initiative?’, Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear
Materials Management (2000) (note 30); Schweitzer, G. E., Swords into Market Shares: Technology,
Economics and Security in Russia (John Henry Press: Washington, DC, 2000); and US General Account
ing Office (GAO), Nuclear Proliferation: Concerns with DOE’s Efforts to Reduce the Risks Posed by
Russia’s Unemployed Weapons Scientists, GAO/RCED-99-54 (GAO: Washington, DC, Feb. 1999).
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of 1954 prohibits the release of restricted data and the sharing of such data with
other states, except for mutual defence purposes. The DOE must negotiate a
formal bilateral Agreement for Cooperation in order to share restricted data
with a state with which the USA does not have a mutual defence agreement.
The DOD and the DOE share the classification authority for information on the
basing of nuclear weapons and other related matters.40
To support the initiatives of the early 1990s, the fiscal year (FY) 1993 and
1994 Defense Authorization Acts amended the Atomic Energy Act, granting
authority to negotiate an Agreement for Cooperation with Russia to allow the
sharing of limited amounts of national security information as mutually agreed
by the parties to be useful for monitoring arrangements. This provided the legal
basis for an ambitious effort to create broad transparency between the two
states. It should be noted that Russia’s nuclear exports and imports could also
cause complications for the legal completion of an Agreement for Cooperation.
Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act requires that the president must deter
mine whether Russian nuclear exports can assist the nuclear weapon pro
grammes of other states, such as India and Iran.41 The Iranian Government
intends to complete the unfinished German nuclear power plant in Bushehr that
was begun under the Shah. In 1992 Russia agreed to finish the Bushehr plant
and in 1995 agreed to build a new commercial nuclear power plant for Iran with
water–water power reactors, the VVER-1000 (Vodo-Vodyanoy Energet
icheskiy Reaktor). The export of commercial, non-military reactors is permitted
under the NPT, but the US Government contends that such exports provide
knowledge of and access to the Russian nuclear complex that could assist Iran’s
alleged efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.42 In addition, Russian fuel exports
for the Indian Tarapur reactors violate the provision of the 1978 Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines not to export to states that do not have fullscope safeguards,43 although Russia maintains that these exports are needed for
safety reasons. Finally, if Russia imports US-origin spent fuel for the proposed
international spent-fuel repository, this will require an Agreement for Coopera

40 Habiger, E. (Commander, US Strategic Command), Department of Defense News Briefing, 16 June
1998, URL <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1998/t06231998_t616hab2.html>.
41 Section 129 (Chapter 11) prohibits the export of any nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive
nuclear technology to ‘any nation or group of nations that is found by the President to have . . . assisted,
encouraged, or induced any non-nuclear-weapon state to engage in activities involving source or special
nuclear material and having direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive
devices, and has failed to take steps which, in the President’s judgment, represent sufficient progress
toward terminating such assistance, encouragement, or inducement’. The Atomic Energy Act is available
on the Internet site of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission at URL <http://www.nrc.gov/reading
rm/doc-collections/
nuregs/staff/sr0980/>.
42 Eisenstadt, M., ‘Russian arms and technology transfers to Iran: policy challenges for the United
States’, Arms Control Today, vol. 31, no. 2 (Mar. 2001), pp. 15–22.
43 The NSG Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software,
and Related Technology, as they are now called, are incorporated in IAEA document INFCIRC/254. They
have been revised several times since 1978. See URL <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Documents/
Infcircs/Others/infcirc254.shtml>.
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tion with the USA as well as US consent for the reprocessing and re-transfer of
spent fuel.
The Safeguards, Transparency and Irreversibility Initiative
In January 1994 presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed to establish a
joint working group to consider steps to ensure the ‘transparency and irre
versibility’ of nuclear weapon reductions. In May 1994 the working group
agreed to examine options for: (a) declaring all stocks and locations of weaponusable fissile material; (b) carrying out reciprocal inspections of storage facili
ties containing fissile materials removed from dismantled warheads; and
(c) making irreversible transfers of fissile material to peaceful purposes. These
terms of reference were strengthened at their September 1994 summit meeting,
where they agreed to: (a) exchange detailed information on the aggregate
stockpiles of nuclear warheads and weapon-usable nuclear materials;
(b) develop a regular process for exchanging this information; and (c) direct the
joint working group to develop measures to improve confidence in and increase
the transparency and irreversibility of nuclear weapon reductions.44
The USA envisaged a transparency and irreversibility regime that provided
for the exchange of detailed information and reciprocal inspections to confirm
that HEU and plutonium had been removed from nuclear warheads. The regime
was also intended to include cooperative measures to confirm the existence of
excess warheads awaiting dismantlement as well as cooperative measures to
confirm and clarify declared weapon-usable material stocks, but not to include
materials in weapons or in naval fuel. In addition, the regime was to include
exchange visits to the fissile material production sites and exchanges of pro
duction records.
In response to the progress of the joint Russian–US working group, presidents
Clinton and Yeltsin agreed in May 1995 to negotiate agreements on the follow
ing measures: (a) a regular exchange of detailed information on aggregate
stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of weapons-usable fissile materials
and on their safety and security; (b) a cooperative arrangement for reciprocal
monitoring at storage facilities of weapon-usable fissile materials removed from
nuclear warheads; and (c) other cooperative measures as necessary to enhance
confidence in the reciprocal declarations on fissile material stockpiles.45 The
Clinton–Yeltsin statement also declared that: (a) fissile materials removed from
nuclear weapons being eliminated and excess to national security requirements
will not be used to manufacture new nuclear weapons; (b) no newly produced
44 Goodby (note 38), p. 182; and Joint Statement on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Security by the
Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation (The White House, Office of the
Press Secretary: Washington, DC, 28 Sep. 1994), available at URL <http://csf.colorado.edu/dfax/npn/
npn13.htm>. The meeting took place under the auspices of the US–Russian Joint Commission on
Economic and Technological Cooperation, known as the Gore–Chernomyrdin Commission, which was
established in 1993.
45 Joint Statement on the Transparency and Irreversibility of the Process of Reducing Nuclear Weapons
(The White House, Office of the Press Secretary: Washington, DC, 10 May 1995).
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fissile materials will be used in nuclear weapons; and (c) fissile materials from
or within civil nuclear programmes will not be used to manufacture nuclear
weapons.
Although Russia and the USA appeared to be moving towards an initial
regime for warhead and fissile material reductions, Russia broke off the talks in
late 1995 and they were not resumed. Some US experts believe that the agenda
was simply too broad and ambitious for the time and circumstances. Matthew
Bunn cites three reasons for ‘the transparency that never happened’.46
1. The historical legacy of tsarist and communist secrecy made the Russian
Government ‘extraordinarily reluctant to open nuclear secrets’.
2. Many in the US Government were equally unwilling to make US facilities
accessible to Russia.
3. The US Government never offered significant strategic or financial incen
tives to overcome Russian reluctance.
Even in the absence of high-level negotiations, extensive and innovative tech
nical discussions and experiments between Russian and US laboratories have
continued as part of the laboratory-to-laboratory programme. Significant pro
gress has been made in the joint development of approaches for monitoring
warhead dismantlement and the storage of fissile components, as well as on
arrangements for fissile materials. Since information barriers block the transfer
of information containing restricted data, it would seem that an Agreement for
Cooperation would not be needed for the collection of such data.
The production and disposition of fissile materials
General approaches
The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Four of the NPT-recognized NWS have
officially declared that they have stopped the production of HEU and plutonium
for nuclear weapon purposes.47 In a major initiative, the 1992 Russian–US
informal agreement to ban the production of fissile materials was expanded to
create the concept of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). On
27 September 1993, President Clinton proposed at the United Nations a multi
lateral agreement to halt the production of HEU and plutonium for nuclear
explosives. In December 1993 the General Assembly adopted by consensus a
resolution calling for the initiation of negotiations.48 The January 1994 Clinton–
Yeltsin summit meeting produced a joint statement calling for ‘the most rapid
conclusion’ of the FMCT.

46
47

Bunn (note 38), pp. 46–47.
Grand (note 26). The cut-off dates for HEU and Pu production for weapons were as follows: France
(1996/1992), Russia (1987/1994, except for 3 reactors), the UK (1963/1995) and the USA (1988/1964).
48 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/75L, Dec. 1993.

US NUC LEAR S EC UR ITY C OOP ER ATION WITH R US S IA

97

The FMCT concept focuses primarily on the five NPT-recognized NWS and
the three de facto NWS (India, Israel and Pakistan), but all other states would
be invited to join the regime.49 In 1995 the CD agreed by consensus to establish
an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty, but progress stalled over a number of
issues. For example, India and a few other states have declared that they would
not sign an FMCT unless a strict deadline was set for the NWS to fulfil their
NPT Article VI obligations to eliminate their nuclear weapons. Issues of ballis
tic missile defence, the weaponization of outer space (raised by China) and the
no-first-use of nuclear weapons have also blocked progress. Since the CD
operates on a consensus basis, a deadlock can easily be created, as happened in
this case.
The cost of verifying an FMCT would vary greatly depending on the
approach adopted. 50 It is unlikely that the treaty’s monitoring provisions would
apply to stockpiles of fissile material produced in the NWS before it entered
into force. The FMCT could establish safeguards at all the power plants in the
NWS, which would raise the costs since there are about as many nuclear power
plants in the NWS as there are in the NNWS. However, safeguarding all reac
tors worldwide would not double the IAEA’s burden since the IAEA also per
forms other tasks. It is envisaged that the IAEA would conduct routine FMCT
inspections at plutonium and HEU production and storage sites in the NWS.
Precedents and experience relevant to an FMCT. A number of international
arrangements offer precedents and experience that could be useful for an
FMCT. A ban on the production of HEU is monitored under the 1989 Hexa
partite Enrichment Project, in which six states—Australia, Germany, Japan, the
Netherlands, the UK and the USA—place all their civil centrifuge plants under
IAEA safeguards.51 Monitoring to distinguish between HEU and low-enriched
uranium (LEU) is an integral part of this arrangement. This type of monitoring
could be extended to all types of enrichment plant. States which have nuclearpowered submarines have asked for an exemption for HEU fuels for naval
propulsion. This issue could be avoided by designing the next generation of
naval power plants to operate at levels well below 90 per cent uranium-235
enrichment, which several states have already done.52
Most of the NWS have sufficient weapon-grade plutonium, so they no longer
reprocess military spent fuel. This is easy to monitor on a permanent basis
49 Albright and O’Neill (note 25).
50 Koyama, K., ‘What the verification

regime under a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty could be like: a
preliminary view’, Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, vol. 27 (winter 1999), pp. 48–52; and
Bragin, V. and Carlson, J., ‘An introduction to focused approach to verification under FMCT’, Journal of
Nuclear Materials Management, vol. 28 (winter 2000), pp. 39–45. Some have speculated that the budgets
needed would be about the size of the annual IAEA safeguards budget of $80 million, but this would
clearly depend on the regime.
51 von Baeckmann, A., ‘Implementation of IAEA safeguards in centrifuge enrichment plants’, Proceed
ings of the Fourth International Conference on Facility Operations—Safeguards Interface, 29 Sep.–4 Oct.
1991 (American Nuclear Society: LaGrange Park, Ill., 1991), pp. 185–90.
52 Ma, C. and von Hippel, F., ‘Ending the production of highly enriched uranium for naval reactors’,
Nonproliferation Review, vol. 8, no. 1 (spring 2001), pp. 86–101. France uses HEU containing 90%
U-235, but is switching to 7%.
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when plants have been closed, but it is more complicated if the plants continue
to be used to reprocess civilian spent fuel to obtain separated plutonium for
fabrication into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. The reprocessing plants in the NNWS
were originally designed to accommodate IAEA material accounting measure
ments, but plants in the NWS were not. The monitoring of plutonium under an
FMCT would also have to ensure that new plutonium remained inside the
civilian nuclear fuel cycle and not in weapons. In order to obtain accurate
material balances and track the material throughout its use, it would be neces
sary to measure flow rates at predetermined key measurement points in the
plant.
In order to be confident that clandestine production of HEU or plutonium is
not taking place in the NNWS, the IAEA has instituted the Strengthened Safe
guards System under INFCIRC/540, by which states are required to make dec
larations about their research and development for enrichment and reprocessing
technologies.53 INFCIRC/540 also establishes environmental monitoring to
detect clandestine plants. Special inspections under traditional INFCIRC/153
type measures already allow further inspection of a declared site to confirm
declarations.54 Special inspections can also be applied at undeclared sites. (The
IAEA had requested such inspections in North Korea.) The inspection regime
under INFCIRC/540 will allow managed access to undeclared facilities in order
to confirm the absence of undeclared production.
Russian–US programmes and initiatives
The HEU Agreement. HEU poses a more serious proliferation danger than plu
tonium does since it is easier to use to manufacture nuclear warheads. HEU is
not a significant spontaneous neutron emitter and can be fabricated for use in a
nuclear warhead with the simpler gun-type design. At the same time, HEU has
the great advantage that it can be relatively easily converted into LEU fuels that
have considerable commercial value. By contrast, the use of plutonium in MOX
fuels is very costly. For these basic economic reasons, significant progress has
been made in reducing the Russian and US excess HEU stockpiles, while very
little progress has been made in disposing of excess plutonium.
Under the 1993 HEU Agreement the USA agreed to purchase 500 tonnes of
Russian HEU down-blended to LEU.55 From June 1995 to 31 December 2002,
Russia received about $2.5 billion (of the new 2002 projected $8 billion total)
53 IAEA, Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic
Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, INFCIRC/540, Sep. 1997, and subsequent corrections,
available at URL <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Documents/Infcircs/Numbers/nr501-550.shtml>.
54 IAEA, The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Con
nection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT Model Safeguards
Agreement), INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), June 1972, available at URL <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/
Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf153.shtml>. Comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreements are based on this
document.
55 The text of the HEU Agreement is reproduced in SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (Oxford University Press:
Oxford, 1994), pp. 673–75.
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for 5027 tonnes of LEU down-blended from 171 tonnes of HEU.56 The contract
value has varied over time, depending on market prices.
The USA declared 174 tonnes of its HEU as excess, with some to be downblended into reactor fuel and some to be disposed of as waste. In addition,
Minatom and the US NNSA are working together to down-blend excess HEU
that resides outside of the Russian military complex. So far, the programme has
down-blended 2 tonnes of HEU, with additional plans to down-blend more.57
The ability to monitor the weapon usability and origin of the HEU feedstock
has taken time to evolve.58 The US–Russian Transparency Review Committee
has established monitoring procedures at the three relevant Russian facilities:
Russian and US personnel have the right to visit processing facilities to check
tags/seals, verify supporting documents, observe critical processing steps, and
take measurements of uranium isotopic content and mass. The committee
established the certification process for US instruments, such as the HEU/LEU
Blend-Down Monitoring System.59 The acceptance of enhanced monitoring was
facilitated by a prepayment of $100 million, which gives the USA inspection
privileges at Russian facilities. These inspections are necessary to assure the
USA that the LEU is derived from weapon-grade HEU.
Up to 24 inspections are allowed each year along with a permanent monitor
ing office. Adequate set-ups for providing assurances that the uranium feed
stock for down-blending comes from a weapon-grade uranium feed exist at one
of the facilities, but not at the other two, where the monitoring equipment is not
yet in place. 60 The FY 2001 budget for the NNSA called for monitoring equip
ment to be installed at Zelenogorsk in FY 2002 and for discussions to be initi
ated in FY 2002 on the installation of a down-blend monitoring system at
Seversk in FY 2003. The USA does not monitor the complete chain of custody
of HEU, from warhead to arrival at the down-blending facilities, but spot
checks have given confidence that the material comes from dismantled war
heads.61
In July 1998 the US Government purchasing agent, the US Enrichment Cor
poration (USEC), was privatized. This placed market considerations in conflict

56 United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), ‘US–Russian Megatons to Megawatts Program:
turning nuclear warheads into electricity (as of 31 December 2002)’, URL <http://www.usec.com/>.
57 Wander, T. et al., ‘Model and pilot projects on HEU consolidation and converting into LEU in
SRI SIA “Luch” [Scientific Research Institute, Scientific Industrial Association ‘Luch’, Russian Ministry
of Atomic Energy]’, Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials
Management (2000) (note 30).
58 US General Accounting Office (GAO), Nuclear Proliferation: Status of Transparency Measures for
US Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium, GAO/RCED-99-194 (GAO: Washington, DC, Sep.
1999).
59 Mastal, E. et al., ‘Certification of US instrumentation in Russian nuclear processing facilities’, Pro
ceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (2000) (note 30).
60 Mastal, E. et al., ‘Current and future directions for the implementation of the US/Russian Intergov
ernmental Agreement: transparency and the natural feed component’, Proceedings of the 41st Annual
Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (2000) (note 30).
61 GAO (note 58).
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with the broader goals of arms control.62 The HEU Agreement has been close to
collapse on several occasions, but the differences have been resolved or resolu
tion postponed.63 Funding has been further complicated by the drop in natural
uranium prices. Roughly speaking, the original price of $12 billion was based
on about $8 billion for enrichment services in separative work units (SWUs)
and about $4 billion for the natural uranium feed component. The spot market
price for uranium dropped by more than half from 1996 to 2000, reducing the
payments to Russia. About 50 per cent of the USEC’s sales of LEU in the USA
are from Russian imports and about 40 per cent of its total sales are Russian
LEU. The implementing contract expires at the end of each year.64 Critics of the
new contract that begins in January 2003 claim that Russia is being underpaid
for the uranium going into the enrichment services that are used by the USEC to
keep its uneconomical Paducah plant functioning.65 The USEC states that the
$12 billion contract is now worth $8 billion because natural uranium will be
returned to Russia and the market-based enrichment price will begin at
$90.42 per SWU.
Management and disposition of excess weapon plutonium. Recognizing the
greater proliferation risks posed by excess weapon-grade plutonium, in 1992
President George H. W. Bush’s National Security Advisor, General Brent
Scowcroft, asked the National Academy of Sciences to study the options for
plutonium management and disposition. In a two-volume study released in
1994 and 1995, the Academy’s Committee on International Security and Arms
Control (CISAC) recommended that Russian and US excess weapon plutonium
be converted into a form that is at least as inaccessible for weapon use as the
plutonium in spent-fuel rods from civilian nuclear power production.66 This
would put weapon plutonium in the category of risks posed by spent fuel, which
the CISAC also strongly recommended addressing. The CISAC determined that
two approaches were acceptable to fulfil the ‘spent-fuel standard’: (a) the
encapsulation of diluted plutonium in a radioactive matrix (immobilization) for
eventual geological disposal with other high-level nuclear waste; and (b) the
62 Neff, T., ‘Privatizing US national security: the US–Russian HEU deal at risk’, Arms Control Today,
vol. 28, no. 6 (Aug./Sep. 1998), pp. 8–14.
63 Bieniawski, A., Bussurin, Y. and Bystrov, A., ‘Cooperation under the US–Russian Intergovernmental
Agreement on the Disposition of Highly-Enriched Uranium from Nuclear Weapons and transparency
arrangements under the HEU Purchase Agreement’, Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Insti
tute for Nuclear Materials Management (2000) (note 30).
64 United States Enrichment Corporation, ‘Implementation of the US–Russian HEU Purchase Program’,
Hearing on Department of Energy Nonproliferation Programs with Russia, Committee on Foreign Rela
tions, US Senate, 28 Mar. 2001.
65 US General Accounting Office (GAO), Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implications of the US Purchase
of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium, GAO-01-148 (GAO: Washington, DC, 2000); Neff, T., ‘Decision
time for the HEU deal: US security vs. private interests’, Arms Control Today, vol. 31, no. 5 (June 2001),
pp. 12–17; and Sewell, P., ‘A response to Thomas Neff’s “Decision time for the HEU deal’”, Arms
Control Today, vol. 31, no. 6 (July/Aug. 2001), pp. 14–16.
66 US National Academy of Sciences (NAS), Committee on International Security and Arms Control
(CISAC), Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (National Academy Press: Wash
ington, DC, 1994); and NAS/CISAC, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium:
Reactor Related Options (National Academy Press: Washington, DC, 1995).
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use of plutonium as MOX fuel in existing reactors without subsequent repro
cessing.
To encourage the disposition of large stocks of plutonium, the two govern
ments formed the US–Russian Joint Steering Committee on Plutonium Man
agement. In January 1997 the DOE announced that it would use either immobi
lization or the MOX route for the US disposition programme. On 2 September
1998, Clinton and Yeltsin signed a joint statement of principles for the disposi
tion of 50 tonnes of plutonium by each state using either the immobilization or
the MOX approach.67 They also agreed to develop acceptable methods for
transparency measures, including international verification and stringent stan
dards of MPC&A.
On 1 September 2000 Russia and the USA signed the Plutonium Manage
ment and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), according to which each party must
remove 34 tonnes of plutonium from its nuclear weapon programme and con
vert it into forms that will be irreversibly removed from military purposes.68
The agreement is to remain in effect until the plutonium is irradiated to a speci
fied level or is immobilized for geological storage. In January 2002 the George
W. Bush Administration supported the MOX disposition programme, but did
not provide a budget, while it halted the immobilization programme. Although
the agreement does not specify a monitoring approach, each state is responsible
for accounting for its materials, with reciprocal rights of inspection and specific
monitoring arrangements to be negotiated. The agreement calls for ‘an appro
priate arrangement’ between the IAEA, Russia and the USA. 69 Uncertainties
about funding in both Russia and the USA make the planning of plutonium dis
position difficult.
The Mayak Storage Facility Transparency Agreement. In 1991 Minatom
Minister Viktor Mikhailov stated that the former Soviet Union would need a
large facility near Tomsk in which to store excess weapon-usable materials
under secure conditions. In January 1996 US Secretary of Defense William
Perry and Mikhailov agreed on the construction of a storage facility for excess
weapon-usable fissile materials at Mayak (Chelyabinsk-65).70
The Mayak facility was designed in 1996 to accommodate 50 000 canis
ters filled with 66 tonnes of plutonium and 536 tonnes of HEU at a cost of
67 Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, US Department of Energy, ‘Record of decision issues for
surplus plutonium disposition’, URL <http://www.doe-md.com>. The decision allows for the disposition
of 50 tonnes of plutonium—33 tonnes as MOX and 17 tonnes as immobilized waste. The 1 Sep. 2000
Russian–US agreement provides for 34 of the 50 tonnes. Holgate, L., ‘US/Russian cooperation for plu
tonium disposition—update’, Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear
Materials Management (2000) (note 30). The programme is expected to cost about $4 billion without
immobilization for the USA and $1.75 billion for Russia. The USA will contribute $200 million to assist
the Russian effort and both countries plan to ask for additional assistance from the G8.
68 The Agreement concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer
Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation, 1 Sep. 2000, available at URL <http://www.
ransac.org/new-web-site/related/agree/bilat/pudisp-agree.html>. The PMDA had not entered into force as
of Dec. 2002
69 Such an arrangement is being considered under the Trilateral Initiative, described in chapter 11 in
this volume.
70 US General Accounting Office (note 33), p. 8.
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Figure 5.2. A model of the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility, under construction
at Ozersk, Russia
Source: US Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Technology Research and Development for
Arms Control (Office of Nonproliferation Research and Engineering, National Nuclear Security
Agency: Washington, DC, spring 2001).

$275 million.71 The first wing has been rescheduled to open in 2003 and
estimated to cost about $500 million, with the USA paying 90 per cent of this
sum. This wing is designed to keep 25 000 containers, holding a total of
50 tonnes of plutonium and perhaps as much as 200 tonnes of HEU.72 A second
wing of the same size could have been opened by 2010, but the $250 million in
funding was not obtained.73
The two states agreed on ‘joint accountability and transparency measures’
that would permit the USA to confirm Mayak’s holdings. The US Congress
expects confirmation that the materials are weapon-usable, but it will be much
more difficult to verify that the plutonium originated from dismantled warheads.
This would require measuring the attributes of the plutonium pits when they are
brought to the Russian pit processing and packaging facility for conversion into
spheres or hockey-puck shapes, but this requirement appears to have been
relaxed.
The draft monitoring arrangement grants the USA considerable access to the
Mayak storage facility, but the type of monitoring and the number of attributes

71 Under the Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, the DOE spent $63 million for
32 700 canisters for Mayak. See US General Accounting Office (note 33), p. 4.
72 HEU produces little heat and was to be used as heat spacers between the plutonium containers. The
heat output from plutonium has caused some design problems, reducing storage capacity. Forced convec
tion will be used to reduce plutonium heating.
73 US General Accounting Office (note 33), pp. 5–7.
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Figure 5.3. A crane at the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility, lowering fissile
material into a ‘nest’
Note: A nest is a cylindrical space several metres in length, in which the AT-400R canisters are
stacked.
Source: US Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Technology Research and Development for
Arms Control (Office of Nonproliferation Research and Engineering, National Nuclear Security
Agency: Washington, DC, spring 2001).

to be measured have not yet been finalized.74 The DOE is currently developing
a ‘single suite of equipment’ for use in several monitoring arrangements.
74 US General Accounting Office (note 33), p. 10. The technical options under consideration are
addressed in chapter 11 in this volume. Russia pledges not to remove any material from the Mayak facil
ity, other than for emergency purposes, without first negotiating provisions to assure the USA that the
material would not be reused for weapons. US inspectors could monitor Mayak 6 times per year and use
data from Mayak’s material control and accounting system. US monitors could spend up to 5 days con
ducting the initial inspection. During each inspection, the monitors could download recorded data from
sensors used by Russia to identify, scan and track each container as it passes through Mayak’s unloading
and incoming control rooms. Annually, US monitors could randomly select up to 120 storage shafts (4%
of Mayak’s capacity) and verify the identifying tags on containers against Mayak’s records. US monitors
have the right to scan 1 container from each of the selected shafts to determine its contents. Russia would
be required to inventory a random number of containers twice a year with US participation.
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The Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA). Russia and the USA
agreed in 1994 to stop producing plutonium and HEU for weapons. However,
Russia continues to operate three plutonium-producing reactors, at Seversk and
Zelenogorsk, because they supply heat and power to nearby communities. In
addition, Russia has insisted that it is necessary to reprocess the spent fuel since
it suffers serious corrosion problems. It was agreed that the resulting plutonium
(about 1 tonne per year) would be stored in oxide form and the USA agreed to
provide assistance to replace or convert these reactors so that they would no
longer produce weapon-grade plutonium. According to the agreement signed by
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and Vice-President Gore on 23 June 1994, the
reactors were to be closed down by 31 December 2000.75 The plutonium pro
duced between 1994 and 2000 was to be placed under bilateral monitoring to
ensure that it would not be used in nuclear weapons. This agreement has not yet
been implemented because of a failure to agree on the ultimate plans for alter
natives to provide power to the communities.
The Processing and Packaging Implementation Agreement (PPIA). T h e
implementation of the PPIA, proposed in 1997, has also faltered, but its provi
sions are often referred to in discussions of plutonium storage at the Mayak
facility. Russian and US pits would be processed into new shapes or amorphous
forms to render them unusable for weapons. The USA has considered the
Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) to convert plu
tonium from excess pits into oxide form. A facility for this purpose, the Pit Dis
assembly and Conversion Facility, was scheduled to be built at Savannah River
by 2005. The ARIES operations will be unclassified once the pits are converted
into plutonium oxide powder. The Russian facility at Mayak is expected to
make 2-kg plutonium sphere ingots, placing two ingots in each canister. Fig
ures 5.2 and 5.3 show a model of the exterior of the Mayak facility and the pro
cess for lowering fissile material into cylinders inside the facility, respectively.
Since the ingots will be in an unclassified shape, they could be accessible to
limited IAEA monitoring. However, Russia considers the isotopic ratio
(Pu-240/Pu-239) to be secret and will protect it by blending plutonium stocks
before measurements are allowed. The US DOD indicated that it would provide
$650 million for construction of this facility, but so far Russia has rejected the
offer, probably because of a need to protect classified information.76
A spent-fuel repository in Russia. Another approach is to build a global spentfuel repository in Russia. A repository that could hold 10 000–20 000 tonnes of
spent fuel might raise some $20 billion for Russia. The availability of such a
repository could reduce the pressure to reprocess, but Russia appears to be
planning to store its spent fuel for 10 years before reprocessing it to make MOX
fuel. In addition, a geological repository is needed for 32 000 tonnes of US
75 von Hippel, F. and Bunn, M., Saga of the Siberian Plutonium-Production Reactors, FAS Public
Interest Report 53, Nov./Dec. 2000, pp. 1–10.
76 US General Accounting Office (note 33), p. 5; and US Department of Energy (DOE), Warhead and
Fissile Material Transparency Program Strategic Plan (DOE: Washington, DC, Feb. 2000), pp. 12–13.
The DOD would assist with transportation but not with operation and maintenance.
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origin spent fuel, as there will otherwise be pressure to reprocess and thus
obtain 300 tonnes of plutonium. In July 2001 President Vladimir Putin signed a
law that allows Russia to import spent fuel for storage and reprocessing.77 How
ever, this presents many legal and political difficulties. The US Nuclear Non
proliferation Act of 1978 constrains the transfer and reprocessing of US-origin
spent fuel and requires that some form of safeguards are maintained over it.78
Russia’s civil nuclear exports to India and Iran could also complicate an
approval from the USA.
Improving MPC&A
The origins of the MPC&A programmes are described above. The purpose of
the US programme is to help Russia with the MPC&A tools needed to
strengthen its monitoring of nuclear materials. It is generally assumed that a
viable transparency and monitoring plan for fissile materials and warheads
would encourage the host states to improve their indigenous MPC&A pro
grammes. The declaration and inspection processes would uncover problems
which could be rectified.
The Russian HEU and plutonium that exist outside weapons are of greatest
concern because these materials are subjected to the least accountancy and
physical protection. The NNSA’s FY 2002 budget proposal stated that
850 tonnes of military and civilian fissile materials stored at 95 sites in the for
mer Soviet Union were probably in need of security upgrades.79 The NNSA
identified 11 Minatom sites that account for about 500 tonnes of fissile mater
ials and 53 Russian Navy sites that contain 315 tonnes in warheads and fuel
which probably need security upgrades. The civilian nuclear complex consists
of 31 sites (18 in Russia and 13 in the newly independent states) which hold
about 32 tonnes of material.
Because of the continuing uncertainties regarding Russia’s MPC&A pro
gramme, the DOE asked the US National Research Council to review it. The
Council’s study concluded that there had been significant progress, but that
there was much more work to be done.80 It also concluded that the Russian
77 Bleek, P. C., ‘Russian Duma passes bill allowing import of spent fuel’, Arms Control Today, vol. 31,
no. 6 (July/Aug. 2001), p. 25; and Guinnessy, P., ‘Russia banks on importing nuclear waste’, Physics
Today, vol. 54, no. 9 (Sep. 2001), pp. 24–25.
78 McGoldrick, F., ‘Proposals for an international spent fuel facility: US law and policy’, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace Non-Proliferation Conference 2000, URL <http://www.ceip.
org/files/events/Conf2000McGoldrick.asp?>; and Bunn, M., ‘Russian import of foreign spent fuel: status
and policy implications’, Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials
Management (2000) (note 30).
79 The NNSA projected that 50% of the 95 sites would have ‘comprehensive upgrades completed’ by
the end of FY 2002. Its projections for the end of FY 2002 were that, of 850 tonnes of fissile materials,
29% would have had ‘comprehensive upgrades completed’, 53% will have had ‘rapid upgrades
completed’ and 67% will have had ‘upgrades underway’. US General Accounting Office (GAO), Nuclear
Proliferation, Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed, GAO-01
312 (GAO: Washington, DC, 2001).
80 National Research Council, Protecting Nuclear Weapons Materials in Russia (National Academy
Press: Washington, DC, 1999); and Bukharin, Bunn and Luongo (note 38).
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MPC&A programme would be a ‘high-priority national security imperative for
the United States for at least a decade’. The MPC&A programme addressed the
following deficiencies in Russia: (a) a lack of unified physical protection stan
dards and inadequate defences within sites; (b) a lack of perimeter-portal moni
tors to detect nuclear materials leaving sites; (c) inadequate central alarms and
assessment and display capabilities; (d) inadequate protection of guards from
weapons and an inadequate guard force; (e) a lack of material accounting pro
cedures to detect and localize nuclear losses; (f) inadequate measurements of
waste and scrap nuclear materials during reprocessing, manufacture and trans
port; and (g) antiquated tamper-indicating seals and tags that fail to provide
timely detection.
The study recommended long-term indigenization of MPC&A activities and
stressed the importance of nurturing Russian ownership of the technical solu
tions resulting from the Russian–US programmes.81 While the DOE has made
substantial headway in implementation, administrative problems in Russia have
impeded progress. In some cases US specialists have been denied routine
access, there has been confusion as to Russian certification requirements for
MPC&A equipment, or there has been indecision on the part of Russia. The
study concluded that neither Russia nor the USA has developed a long-term
strategy to ensure the sustainability of MPC&A systems. Storage areas must be
further consolidated, transportation programmes need to be expanded, and addi
tional US funds should be made available for the indigenization of Russian
MPC&A equipment. In the related area of technology exports, the USA is
sponsoring training programmes in the USA for officials of Russia and the
newly independent states in order to strengthen controls.82
Programmes to assist weapon scientists
Former Soviet nuclear weapon scientists are faced with the stark choices of
unemployment, work in a non-nuclear government job, emigration to another
country or conversion of their skills for work in the civilian sector.83 The 1994
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) programme is a cooperative
Minatom–DOE programme to assist scientists with nuclear weapon expertise to
apply their skills to development and product manufacturing in the commercial
sector. The NNSA has claimed that the programme has provided alternative,
peaceful employment to roughly 8000 former Soviet specialists on weapons of
mass destruction. Another programme is the 1998 Nuclear Cities Initiative
(NCI), which is directed at improving the commercial sector in Russia’s
10 formerly secret and still closed nuclear cities. The NNSA states that
‘30 civilian projects [were] funded through NCI, potentially employing more
81 US Department of Energy (DOE), MPC&A Program Strategic Plan (DOE: Washington, DC, Jan.
1998).
82 Bertsch, G. and Potter, W. (eds), Dangerous Weapons, Desperate States (Routledge: London, 1999).
83 Schweitzer (note 39).
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than 700 people’. The goal is to assist in planning and with loans to establish
new industries. International development centres and open computing centres
have been established in Sarov, Snezhinsk and Zheleznogorsk, but US funding
may be limited in the future.84 Congress combined the IPP and NCI pro
grammes in November 2001.85 A broader approach reaches out to the US com
mercial sector directly through the US Industry Coalition, an association of US
companies and universities. As of December 1998 the IPP programmes had
funded over 400 projects in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. The US
Industry Coalition has brought together the newly independent states and US
commercial entities to collaborate on projects involving about $164 million.86
The International Science and Technology Centre in Moscow and the Science
and Technology Centre in Ukraine have been established to provide former
Soviet nuclear weapon scientists with opportunities in non-military research. 87
The US Department of State manages the science and technology centres,
which have funded 840 non-military scientific projects and engaged over
30 000 scientists between 1994 and 2000. These programmes have experienced
some start-up problems, but they have helped former weapon scientists as
Russia downsizes its complex.
Warhead monitoring
START III
The Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the March 1997 Helsinki sum
mit meeting called for a START III agreement that included ‘measures relating
to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction
of strategic nuclear warheads . . . to promote the irreversibility of deep reduc
tions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads’.88
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin also agreed to ‘explore, as separate issues, pos
sible measures relating to . . . tactical nuclear systems, to include appropriate
confidence-building and transparency measures’, and to ‘consider the issues
related to transparency in nuclear materials’.
The statement linked the US concern about Russian tactical weapons with the
Russian concern about a potential US breakout from the START treaties. How
ever, the statement could be interpreted in a another way. For example, meas
84
85

Desmond (note 39).
US General Accounting Office (note 33); and Bleek, P. C.., ‘DOE threat reduction funding cut, pro
grams reorganized’, Arms Control Today, vol. 31, no. 8 (Dec. 2001), p. 23.
86 Bell, D. et al., ‘Progress in nonproliferation: Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, the US Industry
Coalition, and other international programs’, Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Institute for
Nuclear Materials Management (2000) (note 30).
87 US General Accounting Office (GAO), Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department Oversight
of Science Centers Program, GAO-01-582 (GAO: Washington, DC, 2001).
88 Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces, The White House, Office of
the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, 21 Mar. 1997, available on the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace Internet site at URL <http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/summits6.htm#
parameters>.
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ures relating to the destruction of warheads might be interpreted to apply only
to those warheads that are to be removed under a START III accord or only to
those warheads declared excess to military needs. Although it is important to
dismantle warheads removed from delivery vehicles that are scheduled for
elimination, this is not sufficient. Little would be gained by verifying the dis
mantlement of certain warheads if other warheads in the stockpile could take
their place or if new warheads could be produced to replace them. Warheads
can be interchangeable if the delivery systems are modified.89 To improve
security benefits, transparency measures must be comprehensive. With the
exception of the monitoring provisions specified in the INF and START
treaties, as described above, warheads remain outside the bounds of any trans
parency or verification measures. In the years to come, this will be the greatest
challenge in the development of a comprehensive regime to control warheads
and fissile materials.
Joint technical work
The degree to which warheads are not subjected to any controls or transparency
measures is offset somewhat by the degree to which the DOE laboratory-to
laboratory programme made significant progress in engaging Russian and US
scientists in exploring the challenges of warhead monitoring.90 The 2000 War
head Safety and Security Exchange Agreement was extended in 2001 for five
years to continue exchanges of unclassified warhead data, to enhance the safety
and security of nuclear weapons, and to continue the laboratory-to-laboratory
contracts which support research in this area. There has been considerable
progress on this work, as described in appendix 8A, but more advances could
have been made with greater political cooperation at the highest levels of both
governments.

V. Conclusions
The negotiations on and initiatives for reducing cold war nuclear arsenals and
for strengthening transparency have led to the establishment of cooperative pro
grammes and measures that would have been inconceivable a decade earlier. In
the area of enhancing controls over fissile materials and establishing mutual
monitoring rights, the progress has been without precedent. Security at Russian
nuclear facilities is being enhanced through the MPC&A programme, and
89 E.g., US Minuteman ICBMs carry the W87 warhead developed for the MX missile, but they could
also be armed with the W62 or W78 warhead developed for the Minuteman, large numbers of which are
maintained in storage. The Trident II SLBM can carry either the W76 or the W88 warhead, or both; large
numbers of W76 warheads are maintained in storage. With modifications, the Minuteman could carry the
SLBM warheads and the Trident II could carry the ICBM warheads. Different types of weapons often
share the same nuclear components, so 1 type could be used as the basis for another, just as the USA used
W85 warheads from eliminated Pershing II missiles to build new B61 bombs. Russia reportedly has an
even greater degree of interchangeability within its warhead stockpile.
90 Bieniawski and Irwin (note 37).
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excess fissile materials are being constrained with the construction of the
Mayak storage facility and the HEU Agreement. However, much more work
remains to be done. This section summarizes the lessons of the past decade.
The Russian Advisory Task Force appointed by US Secretary of Energy Bill
Richardson argued for considerably increased funding and stronger directions
in a report in 2001. The findings of the panel, chaired by former Senator
Howard Baker and former Presidential Counsellor Lloyd Cutler, should be
closely examined because of the high calibre of its membership and its biparti
san nature.91
1. The most urgent national security threat to the United States is the danger
that weapons of mass destruction, or weapon-usable material in Russia, could
be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile states and used against US troops
abroad or citizens at home.
2. The current non-proliferation programmes of the DOE, the DOD and
related agencies have achieved impressive results, but their limited mandate and
funding fall short of what is required to adequately address the threat.
3. The president and congress face the urgent national security challenge of
devising an enhanced response proportionate to the threat.
The panel declared that Russia and the USA should agree at high levels of
government on the degree of transparency needed to ensure that US-funded
activities will have measurable impacts. It recommended $30 billion in addi
tional funding over the next decade, which would be 1 per cent of the projected
US defence budget for this period.
Lessons
The past decade began with a high degree of cooperation between Russia and
the USA on enhancing physical security, improving fissile material accounting,
developing new monitoring approaches and providing for the irreversible dis
position of excess nuclear warheads and materials. Over the past few years,
however, progress has waned as competing pressures in each state have caused
delays. These problems must be resolved if progress is to be renewed.
Access rights and reciprocity
The lack of access to critical facilities in both states has adversely affected the
ability to win consensus on monitoring regimes. US officials have made many
more visits to Russia than Russian officials have to the USA since Russia has
more excess material, some of which is not adequately guarded, and more
91 Baker, H. and Cutler, L. (Co-Chairs, Russian Task Force, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board), A
Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia (US Department of
Energy: Washington, DC, 10 Jan. 2001), pp. 2–3, available at URL <http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/
npp/pdf/doetaskforceappendices.pdf>.
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MPC&A measures are needed. The USA is asking for and feels entitled to
access rights because it is purchasing Russian HEU and funding the Mayak
storage complex. For the overall benefit of their cooperation, it is clear that the
USA should ensure the development of as much symmetry as possible between
the two sides.
Degree of monitoring
The level of monitoring can rise with increased experience and trust, as in the
case of monitoring under the HEU Agreement.
Secrecy
The former Soviet Union was often obsessed with secrecy, but the USA also
exhibits this tendency. Segments of the US Government are negative towards
the constraints of mutual monitoring. The recent concerns about the loss of
secret information from Los Alamos sparked the creation of the National
Nuclear Security Administration and the introduction of lie-detector tests at the
national laboratories, which has affected staff morale. While there are legitimate
reasons for keeping national security information secret, relatively harmless
facts are also kept secret, which can impede Russian–US progress in reducing
the nuclear threat. The USA favours ‘transparency measures’ in general, but in
Russia there is a fear that they would allow the stronger party to spy on the
weaker one. The USA has learned a great deal about the Russian nuclear com
plex. Although this knowledge may not be of great assistance to the US mili
tary, it is often hard to convince Russian officials of this.
Entanglement with other issues
Cooperation and progress have been slowed by other, unrelated issues, such as
the US involvement in the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, the
enlargement of NATO, the abandonment of the ABM Treaty and the planned
deployment of missile defences. To the extent that these issues adversely affect
Russian–US relations, they make the task of improving controls over nuclear
weapons and materials harder to achieve.
Diplomatic strategy
The eagerness of the USA to move forward on a large and complex agenda may
in 1995 have frightened Russia into pulling out of the negotiations on the
Agreement for Cooperation and taking a more hesitant position concerning
transparency and irreversibility. The USA has more personnel available to con
duct negotiations, thus causing Russia to suffer from ‘negotiation fatigue’. This
may be one of the reasons why Russia prefers a slow, ‘step-by-step’ approach.
Ultimately, both states will act only when they view a particular arrangement as
beneficial to their national security.
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Incentives
The financial assistance which the USA provided to Russia in exchange for
monitoring rights has created an incentive that has sometimes helped move the
agenda forward. Unless Russia and the USA return to their former level of
cooperation, the availability of funds will be a less effective incentive in the
future. Once the USA has completed its purchase of the Russian HEU, paid for
the Mayak facility and helped with MPC&A, it is less clear what type of finan
cial arrangements can promote mutual monitoring. National pride, the fear of
revealing secret information and the rising price of Russian oil all contribute to
reducing the incentives Russia has had from financial aid. Funding alone will
not be enough to determine the best approach to devising the best arrangements,
and there are reasons to believe that this approach should be gradual, with a
negotiation strategy based on unilateral measures and executive agreements.
Leadership
Between 1994 and 1997, presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed on four occa
sions to broad measures for the enhancement of transparency, irreversibility and
safeguards on excess nuclear warheads and materials. One agreement was to
exchange stockpile data, but thus far only the USA has responded and only with
data on its plutonium stockpile. In general, while technology experts in both
states agree on the usefulness and value of the monitoring technologies, this
does not always translate into policy. There is concern that support for these
programmes may diminish unless there is a commitment from leaders at the
highest level.92 The Bush Administration’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty,
its rejection of the stronger verification measures of the proposed START III
accord and the downgrading of some cooperative programmes with Russia,
taken together, is not a hopeful sign.
An integrated approach
The programmes outlined in this chapter are complex and difficult to analyse.
US Government proposals and budget requests have often seemed to be overly
detailed and lacking in coherence. Acceptance of these programmes overall has
been negatively affected by such complexities. It is obvious that a more inte
grated approach is necessary. One attempt in this direction has been made by
Siegfried Hecker, former Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, who
has called for an integrated strategy of nuclear cooperation with Russia.93 It is to
be hoped that more proposals for strategies of this type will be made and will
gain momentum in the near future.
92 Luongo (note 38).
93 Hecker, S., ‘Thoughts

about an integrated strategy for nuclear cooperation with Russia’, Nonprolif
eration Review, vol. 8, no. 2 (summer 2001), pp. 1–24. Hecker developed an integrated approach for
33 issues, under 6 generic topics, for 3 situations. In the first, Russia is an ally of the USA, in the second
Russia’s status remains unchanged, and in the third Russia re-emerges as an adversary.

